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Concern over the potential effects of oil spills on the
waters of the world has led to increasing efforts to analyze
and control the problem. Emphasis has "been placed on
programs which offer improvements in the technology of oil
spill removal and greater efficiency in enforcement and
prevention measures. The concern is warranted. Some
scientists estimate that about five million tons of petro-
leum and related products are entering the world's oceans
each year.-*- The advent of the supertanker has given rise to
the threat of local cataclysms; indeed, many have occurred
( e.g . , Torrey Canyon , Ocean Eagle) . These large spills are
significant, but it is important to consider the smaller
spills as well. The damage done by one careless boater who
tosses overboard the contents of a coffee can full of water
and oil from his boat's bilges might seem insignificant, but
when his act is multiplied by a thousand or a million users
of one body of water, the damage approaches catastrophy.
Efforts must be continued to control the oil pollution
problem and its resulting damage to commercial fisheries,
recreational waterways, and the aesthetic value of an area
from all sources of oil spill incidents.
1 Blumer, Max, "Scientific Aspects of the Oil Spill
Problem," Environmental Managements Science and Politics ,
Morton and Marsha Gordon, ed., p. 32^, Allyn & Bacon, Inc.,

This thesis intends to analyze the decision process of
firms engaged in potentially polluting industry in an effort
to isolate the effects of penalties and other pollution costs.
The intent is to provide the Marine Environmental Protection
(MEP) program manager with an understanding of the conse-
quences of alternative strategies on the control of pollution
in his area.
An economic model of the firm's decision process will be
developed, and a simple analysis using a variety of decision
strategies will be made, using the model, to determine the
various results from different strategies.
The number of theorists in any field always seems to out-
number those with practical answers for the manager to use.
The theoretical model in this thesis will be analyzed with
respect to the existing data base to determine whether or not
it has any practical application.
A final function of this thesis is to suggest other areas
for potential research in the area of MEP program and
systems management and to provide a critique of the existing
data system in an effort to make it more responsive to the
Coast Guard, as an enforcement agency, and to the researcher
of oil pollution questions. These recommendations are in the
form of NOTES, which are inserted as appendices at the end of
this paper.
Certain assumptions are necessary to this study. There
are also limitations to the theoretical model which has been
developed, but these do not demean the research, rather they

make it more useful to the manager, if he recognizes the
instances when he can use this information. This thesis will
treat the firm as a strict economic entity and attempt to
model its decision process. The firm is considered a
rational actor in a free economy which always acts to maxi-
mize its expected profits. It is recognized that other
factors enter into the firm's decision process. The social
consciousness of the management, other objectives beyond
profit-making, and external pressures on the firm will alter
the pure profit-making motive and, hence, the predicted
reactions. But it is important, in an initial analysis, to
exclude the idiosyncracies of individual firms when general-
izing about how a firm will react to pollution abatement
policy. It is important for the enforcement agency to
understand the firm's decision process relating to oil
pollution control. If an enforcing agency can visualize the
firm's decision process, then it can apply more efficient and
functional resources to reduce the problem.
Most of the economic analysis of pollution problems has
been concerned with the control of continuous pollution. The
problem of chronic oil discharge into the water has been
virtually eliminated as a result of federal and local regu-
lations and laws forbidding the introduction of oil or
hazardous substances into the water. Although the recent
laws are only as effective as the enforcement, the great
visibility of oil on water and the new environmental
8

consciousness by the public has helped eliminate the problem
of the chronic polluter.
It is the isolated and intermittent oil spill which now
needs more attention. The literature offering solutions to
this problem is sparse. The principle work that this author
was able to uncover dealing specifically with the economics
of oil spills was an article by Paul G. Bradley, "Marine
Oil Spills — A Problem of Environmental Management,"
Natural Resources Journal , June, 197^ • Bradley explores the
factors which enter into the costs of an oil spill and he
reviews the suggested methods for controlling oil spills.
Finally, he outlines some considerations for designing
institutions to maintain environmental quality. It is inter-
esting to note that his cost models vary only slightly, and
not significantly, from those developed in this thesis,
independent of his work.
The data used in this thesis comes from the U. S. Coast
Guard's Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS). The
years 1973 and 197^ were chosen, since the data collected in
these years reflect current regulations and standards of
reporting. The PIRS system was first developed for use in
late 1971 to collect data relative to the nature of oil
discharges into the waters of the United States. After the
Federal Water Pollution Act was amended in 1972, the data
base was greatly expanded to meet growing demands on the
Coast Guard for information on oil pollution incidents.
9

Data is collected on standard forms by local Coast Guard
units which receive the information from internal reports
and reports from other agencies, corporations and private
individuals external to the Coast Guard. The forms are
coded at the District offices and sent to Coast Guard
Headquarters periodically, where the data is batch processed
and stored on magnetic tape. The record contains ^2^ char-
acters with more than 68 data fields. Copies of the standard
forms and the record format are included as Appendix A to
this thesis.
At this point, it may be valuable to include an intro-
ductory chapter on the history and magnitude of the oil
spill problem, but that information is well documented in
many other writings. This thesis does not intend to add to
that general debate. Instead, a theory for practical appli-
cation in controlling oil spills will be explored and
suggestions will be directed toward helping the manager of a
law enforcement agency, such as the Coast Guard, form




II. OIL POLLUTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS
The enforcement of laws related to the use of the seas
has been a traditional Coast Guard role; however, in the last
185 years that role has evolved "beyond the original scope of
the Revenue Cutter Service. It now includes regulations of
vessel safety and operating standards, enforcement of
fisheries laws, oil pollution prevention and control, and
many other duties that probably never occurred to Alexander
Hamilton when he established the Coast Guard in 1790.
One of the newest and continually changing roles of the
Coast Guard is in the area of oil and hazardous substance
regulation and control. A long list of pieces of legislation
have been credited with moving the Coast Guard into the
marine environmental protection field; but, in a sense, the
interests of the service were already there. The inspection
of the merchant vessel fleet, responsibility for boating
safety, and Captain of the Port duties have made the Coast
Guard historically concerned and the logical agency to deal
with the problem of oil pollution on the waters of the United
States.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (40 CFR 1510) contains a listing of the
legal authority which is the background for statutes,
regulations, and administrative orders related to oil
pollution control. This list is Appendix VII of the Plan.
11

The primary piece of legislation that accelerated the nation's
efforts toward oil pollution control, however, is the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, of 1972. It
provided the basis, in law, for much of the Coast Guard
activity related to the implementation and enforcement of the
Marine Environmental Protection Program.
The FWPCA established the requirements and prohibitions
relating to the action of industry, shippers and private
individuals with respect to oil pollution. The major
sections of the FWPCA which concern the Coast Guard are those
which require any discharge of oil or hazardous substance to
be reported to the Coast Guard and which state the respon-
sibilities of the spiller with respect to removal of the
discharged substance. In addition, the Act sets the level of
civil and criminal penalties which may be assessed on
violators of the Act. It also states the national policy
with respect to restoration and maintenance of the integrity
of the nation's waterways as follows:
PL-92-500 Sec. 101(a)(1) "it is the national goal that
the discharge of pollutants into the navi-
gable waters be eliminated by 1985;
(3) it is the national policy
that the discharge of toxic pollutants in
toxic amounts be prohibited;
(6) it is the national policy
that a major research and demonstration
effort be made to develop technology nec-
essary to eliminate the discharge of
pollutants into the navigable waters, waters
of the contiguous zone and the oceans. 1 '
To that end the Act designates the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency as the Administrator of the
Act and establishes authorities and responsibilities of other
12

agencies with respect to the law. This thesis is primarily
concerned with the penalties and costs associated with oil
pollution. Major requirements and penalties for failure to
comply with the laws and regulations regarding oil pollution
follow:
FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT of 1972
1. The law forbids the discharge of oil or hazardous
substances into or upon the navigable waters of the United
States, adjoining shorelines, or the contiguous zone in
harmful quantities. The definition of what determines a
harmful quantity is taken up in regulations established by
the EPA.
2. Any owner or operator from which oil or hazardous
substances is discharged is liable for actual costs of
removal of the discharge within certain limits.
3- The law requires vessels to establish financial
responsibility for spill removal costs in the form of insur
ance, surety bonds, or other evidence of responsibility.
This regulation applies to all vessels over 300 gross tons
except barges which do not carry oil or hazardous substances
as cargo and are not self-propelled. The amount of evidence
required is one hundred dollars per gross ton or 14 million
dollars, whichever is less.
4. Specific penalties for violation of the Act and its
provisions are as follows:
13

a. A civil penalty may be assessed for a discharge
which is determined to be unremovable. This provision was
not in effect for an appreciable time during the period under
study; but it is interesting to point it out, since future
penalties may fall into this category.
(1) The penalty is to be from five hundred
dollars ($500) to five thousand dollars ($5000) based on the
toxicity, degradability, and dispersal characteristics of the
pollutant.
(2) Or a civil penalty based on a standard unit
of measure equal to from one hundred dollars ($100) to one
thousand dollars ($1000) per unit may be assessed. This
penalty is not to exceed five million dollars ($5,000,000).
b. Failure to notify the Coast Guard of an oil spill
incident makes the violator liable for a criminal fine of up
to ten thousand dollars ($10,000) or one year imprisonment or
both.
c. Failure to post proper bonds of financial respon-
sibility can result in civil penalties of up to ten thousand
dollars ($10,000)
.
d. Removal limitations have been set as follows:
(1) one hundred dollars ($100) per gross ton or
fourteen million dollars ($1^,000,000) whichever is less (for
vessels) and




(3) These limits can be extended if negligence
or intent can be established.
e. Civil penalties for violation of regulations are
issued by appropriate agencies with respect to:
(1) methods and procedure for removal
(2) criteria for development of local and
regional contingency plans
(3) procedures, methods, equipment and other
requirements to prevent discharges and to contain those that
do occur
(*0 governing vessel inspections to reduce the
likelihood of a discharge
(5) each violation is considered a separate
offense, each of which is subject to a five thousand dollar
($5000) limitation.
As a result of this law and other provisions, regulations
have been drawn up by the appropriate agencies to provide
specific enforcement definitions and requirements. A review
of present regulations affecting industry and private indi-
viduals is appropriate, since it sets the basis for the
analysis of the economic decision model to be developed. The
limitations and levels of penalties and cleanup costs will
figure into the decision model and determine upper limits on
the impact of enforcement agency penalty levels.
The primary source of data on regulations is the Code of
Federal Regulations and the Federal Register . Appropriate
sections of the Code are:
15

40 CFR 1510 » National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan ( Federal Register , vol. ^0,
No. 28, February 10, 1975)
^0 CFR 109j Criteria for State, Local and Regional Oil
Removal Contingency Plans (EPA)
^0 CFR 110 j Discharge of Oil (EPA)
*K) CFR 112: Oil Pollution Prevention (EPA)
10 CFR 113: Liability Limits for Small Onshore Storage
Facilities (EPA)
33 CFR Subchapter 0: Pollution (USCG)
Key elements and definitions relating to enforcement of
laws and regulations and assessment of penalties for
violations of the regulations follow in the discussion of
the Council of Environmental Quality, the Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard.
A. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1
This organization sets up the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Contingency Plan and defines responsibilities and
terms within the scope of the Plan. Specific definitions of
interest are:
1. Minor discharge: less than one thousand ( 1,000)
gallons on inland waters or less than ten thousand (10,000)
gallons to the coastal waters (waters subject to tidal
variations)
.
2. Medium (Moderate) discharge: one thousand to ten
thousand (1,000 - 10,000) gallons in inland waters and ten to
one hundred thousand (100,000) gallons to the coastal waters.
16 •

3. Major discharge: more than ten thousand (10,000)
gallons inland and one hundred thousand (100,000) gallons to
coastal v/aters OR a discharge which poses a "substantial
threat to the public health or welfare."
k. Removal: cleanup or removal of oil or hazardous
substances from water or shoreline or other actions taken to
minimize damage.
Responsibilities for enforcement are divided between the
agencies involved. The EPA has responsibility for providing
the On-Scene-Commander for spills occurring in inland waters,
and the Coast Guard is responsible for the Coastal waters,
Great Lakes, ports and harbors.
The rest of the plan concerns directions and procedures
for mobilization of regional and national actions to clean
up spills of hazardous substances.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
The EPA has the broadest responsibilities with respect to
pollution control. In regard to oil pollution, the agency:
1. Establishes the requirements and guidelines for
preparation of state, local and regional Oil Removal Contin-
gency Plans, and the coordination of those plans with the
National Plan.
2. Prohibits the discharge of harmful quantities of oil
into the navigable waters of the U.S. that:
a. violate water quality standards




3. Discharges into the contiguous zone are considered
harmful under the same rules, except where altered by
International treaty or convention
h. Prohibits the use of dispersants or emulsifiers to
circumvent the provisions of the FWPCA
5. Requires the discharger to notify the U.S. Coast
Guard
6. Requires owners and operators of onshore and off-
shore facilities to prepare a Spill Prevention Control and
Countermeasure Plan (SPCC) that:
a. is effective in satisfying the requirements
within the regulations
b. is certified by a Registered Professional En-
gineer
c. meets the approval of the regional administrator
of the EPA.
7. Calls for a civil penalty of five thousand dollars
($5000) per day for failure to provide a SPCC by a certain
date. This date is a function of when the firm begins
operations
.




C. U.S. COAST GUARD:
The role of the Coast Guard is restricted to regulation
of oil pollution incidents that occur on the navigable waters
and adjacent shorelines of the United States. Coast Guard
regulations
:
1. Establish prohibited zones for discharges
a. within fifty (50) miles of the coast
b. other designated areas
2. Require the keeping of an Oil Record Book.
3. Delegate authority to the District Commander to
assess civil penalties under the FWPCA.
k. Require the notification of the Coast Guard by rapid
communications
.
5. Establish equipment and operating standards and
inspection requirements for facilities which may discharge
hazardous substances into the water.
6. Authorize the Captain of the Port to suspend
operations of dangerous or potentially dangerous firms.
7. Establish personnel qualifications, requirements for
operating manuals, and vessel design standards relating to
oil and hazardous substance storage and transfer.
8. Administer the Pollution Cleanup Revolving Fund.
This discussion is designed to highlight the regulations
and penalties for violation of the regulations pertaining to
pollution of the oceans and waters by oil. These regulations
and penalties serve as the basis for analysis in later
chapters of this thesis.
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III. ECONOMIC MODEL DEVELOPMENT
In order for an enforcement agency to improve its
effectiveness, it must have an understanding of the behavior
of the group toward which its efforts are directed; and it
must understand how its activities are perceived and inter-
nalized into the decision process of the target organizations.
It is the purpose of this section to present a simple model
of the "behavior of a firm in this economy as it relates to
the oil pollution problem. The variables that will be
isolated are those which deal with the costs that the firm
must consider relative to pollution prevention and the
parameters controllable by the enforcement agency.
It will be assumed that the firm is a purely economic
actor with the objective of maximizing expected profit. This
assumption might be considered a lower bound on the costs
that a firm is willing to accept to avoid the expected costs
associated with spillage of oil. In actual practice, the
firm is likely to place some value on other strategies, such
as community standing or political concerns, and might be
expected to accept higher costs to achieve those objectives.
Initial development of the model will assume that the
firm expects some spillage to occur and can internally set the
expected spill volume and frequency (S). The efforts that the




The first step in the analysis is to look at the pro-
duction function of the firm as it relates to the input of
oil or some other hazardous substance. The firm produces an
output (z) using inputs of oil (x) . The simple production
function for the firm can be stated as:
z = g(x)
As oil inputs increase, the level of output should




The input variable x excludes the amount of oil that is
wasted through spillage and can be given as the difference:
x = x-| - S
where x^ is the total amount of oil that must be purchased
for production, and S is the spillage that occurs. Relating
S to r again, it would be expected that increased efforts to







It can be assumed, that f(x) is not a linear function, since
the firm will first employ those efforts on pollution control
with the greatest marginal return "before turning to efforts
with greater marginal cost. This relationship is shown













If the output of the process sells for a unit price P^
,
that the firm can assess with certainty, and the costs
associated with production can be thought of as those related
to product (x) and pollution prevention efforts (r), it is
possible to construct the profit function for the firm. An
additional cost enters the function, however, as a result of
the laws and regulations concerning oil pollution. If a
discharge occurs, there is some probability that the firm
22

will be assessed a penalty and/or be required to remove the
pollutant. The cost of pollution relative to those costs is
called P2 and must enter into the profit function.
The costs associated with the firm's profit function in
this instance are:
1. Input costs = kx^ where k is the market price of
the input
2. Pollution prevention efforts = r
3. Penalty costs associated with spillage
P
2
= q[C x p(C) + R x p(R)]
where
:
q = probability that the spill will be detected
C = level of the civil penalty
P(C) = probability a penalty will be imposed
P(R) = probability that removal efforts will be
required
The profit function can be written as:
Profit (tt) = P-, z - kx] - r - P
2
S
= P-jZ - kx
1
- r - q[C x p(C) + R x p(R)]-S
This profit can not be expressed as a certain outcome;
therefore, it is necessary to analyze the probabilistic
variables to determine the firm's expected profit. The firm
can assess with certainty the value of P-j_ and the market price
for the input (k) . They will also decide on the optimal
23
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level of r to satisfy the optimization decision. The major
uncertainty relates to the cost of penalties for polluting.
The expression for expected profit can be expressed as:
E(tt) = E(P-,z) - kx
1
- r - E(P
2
S)
For the continuous optimization problem, the firm will
use the level of pollution expenditures and the amount of
input they will purchase as the decision variables. In
order to evaluate this condition, the partial derivative of
the expected profit function will be taken with respect to
the decision variables and the result set equal. to zero. The
results of this exercise will be the optimal economic decision
for the firm based on the model assumptions.
Beginning with the derivative of expected profit with




Setting this equation equal to zero and separating the costs
and revenues it follows that:
E(£l»i)
- k
The firm's decision, then, with respect to input is that
they will continue to purchase oil as long as the revenue
received as a result of the last unit of oil purchased is




It is to be expected that additional inputs of product
should have the effect of increasing output. The sign of
marginal revenue v/ith respect to input is positive. But,
using classical economic theory, one expects diminishing















The marginal revenue function will "be downward sloping to
the right v/ith increasing x
1





The second decision variable is r. The partial








In the conventional form with revenues and costs
separated
E(P!iz_) = "I + 9E( PqS)
3r 5r
The decision criteria, however, is based on the optimal
level of pollution control effort r. Rewritten in that form










The firm's decision criteria is, then, to continue to
employ additional efforts on pollution control until the
resulting increase in marginal revenue plus the decrease in
26

expected penalties is less than or equal to the cost of one
more unit of effort on pollution control. Figure (3) shows





The previous discussion is theoretical in nature and only
accounts for the firm's expected profit motivation. The firm,
in a more realistic sense, will have additional inputs into
its pollution control strategy other than profit maximization.
These inputs may be manifestations of the personal values of
the controlling managers and operating personnel, perceived
27

obligations of the firm to society or other factors which
will serve to alter their pollution strategy around the
profit maximization objective. It is still useful to under-
stand the profit motivation in order to have a baseline for
analysis.
The levels of x and r are internal decisions that must be
made by the firm. The enforcement agency which understands
how these levels are set will be able to assess the effec-
tiveness of their own efforts to achieve their objective.
The optimal strategy for the enforcing agency revolves
around the firm's perceived level of Pp. This external
variable must be examined in order to discover the




The development of the economic decision model in the last
chapter has served to isolate the critical enforcement var-
iables that the Coast Guard has at its disposal for the
assessment of civil penalties on firms which discharge oil
into the nation's waters. The next step in assessing the
practicality of this model is to attempt to quantify as many
of the variables as possible and determine the value of the
model from the known parameters. This will enable the
manager or evaluator of a penalty assessment program to
determine the effectiveness of the fine structure and
expected cleanup costs on the behavior of the firm.
A. METHODOLOGY
Data was taken from the Pollution Incident Reporting
System (PIRS) for the years 1973 and 197^- The choice of
that time period was made because the data base was ex-
panded in late 1973 and the changes were incorporated into
all incidents from January 1, 1973 "to the present. The
expanded system contains much more data for analysis and
exists in standard format.
Before reporting the results of the data analysis, it is
necessary to explain some characteristics of the data and the
assumptions v/hich resulted from those characteristics. The
system contained over twenty-five thousand (25.000) records
for the two-year period. There are over one hundred possible
29
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data fields on each record. Unfortunately, the data con-
tained a high rate of unknown or missing data, which in some
instances ran as high as fifty per cent of the total for a
given field. It was necessary to assume that the missing
data had the same characteristics as the reported data. This
may be a serious limitation to the analysis, since there are
intuitive instances where that assumption might be challenged.
It appears, for instance, that information on costs is
more likely to be reported on larger spills than on smaller
ones, since major spills are often followed closely by the
Coast Guard and documented in special reports. Data would
tend to be more complete for major spills and the data would
be biased toward the larger spill categories. This may be
acceptable, however, since the larger spills generally are of
greater concern than the smaller ones.
Much of the data was subject to subjective determination.
It was impossible to separate, even within a data field,
which of the information was factually determined and which
was estimated. It was assumed, therefore, that all infor-
mation on the data tapes was accurate. There is no need to
speculate on the consequences of that assumption being false.
Appendix C contains a further discussion of the data base and
the problems associated with using it during this research.
The assumptions about the data were necessary to make this
analysis possible. Refinement of the data base would serve
to improve the results of the preliminary analysis. It was
30

not the intention of this study to resolve the data base
problems. Such efforts would require a considerably dif-
ferent form of analysis.
For the purposes of making the presentation concise, most
of the data will be reported in aggregate form. This tends to
minimize the idiosyncracies of individual firms and districts.
Analysis was conducted by dividing the spill incidents into
three categories by spill size. The breakdown was performed
by quantity. For purposes of this study, a minor spill was
any spill under 1,000 gallons. A moderate or medium spill
was from 1,000 to 10,000 gallons, and a major spill was any
spillage over 10,000 gallons. This breakdown conforms
substantially with the categories defined in the oil spill
regulations. The differences that exist can be seen by
examining the definitions in Chapter II of this thesis. The
differences were not apparent from the data, and they were
not considered significant, since the great majority of
reported spills occur within the territorial waters.
It was assumed that any spillage of oil would be dis-
covered and reported to the Coast Guard. This assumption
appears sound, since oil spilled on water is highly visible
and is unlikely to escape detection, particularly in heavily
traveled waterways ( i.e . , q^l.0).
Expected values for the variables of civil penalty and
cost of cleanup were determined for each of the spill
categories and for the total spill range for each of the two
years investigated. The analysis of costs and penalties as
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continuous functions was attempted, but the results were
inconclusive. The limited results will be reported at the
end of this chapter.
Individual firms will assess their own pollution potential
and adjust their strategy to their own particular situation.
The oil pollution record of one large firm will be examined
and compared with the results for the industry. The firm
examined is used only as an example and is not necessarily
typical of any individual firm's record.
The costs associated with spills of a given category were
aggregated to allow a discrete analysis of the decision
process regarding external controls. During the initial
formulation of the model, Pp was assumed to be a per unit
cost of polluting. During this phase of the analysis, costs
are represented as expected costs within a given size category.
The value that P2 takes on depends on the decision criterion
being evaluated. For purposes of this discussion, P? may be
considered to be the sum of the penalty and removal costs
that a firm will incur for a particular size category i.
P
?1
= expected costs for the case when no spillage occurs
Pp ? = expected costs if a minor spill occurs
Ppo = expected costs if a moderate spill occurs
Pp/, = expected costs if a major spill occurs
The probabilities of any spill of size S. occurring in a
given time period are given by:
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f* = probability that no spill occurs
fp = probability that a minor spill occurs
f~ = probability that a moderate spill occurs
fY = probability that a major spill occurs
To simplify analysis, it has been assumed that
f! =
and
f2 + f 3
+ f4 = 1 .0
This assumption is reasonable if the aggregate data is
used or if the time horizon for a particular firm is suf-
ficiently large. Since approximately ten thousand spills
occur every year, it is difficult to imagine a year going by
without any spillage occurring. To be more correct, some
small non-zero value should be attached to f
1
to indicate
that efforts to control pollution do have some positive effect
on reducing the number of spills which occur.
In fact, for a firm which can successfully control
spillage, the value of f
1
for that firm approaches 1.0. In
general, it can be stated that:
df






t_ > for i = 1dr —
For the individual firm it might be more appropriate to
use a distribution which results in f. being assigned a
finite value based on the expected number of discharges for
that particupar firm. Intuitively, it appears that a Poisson
distribution might be appropriate.
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For the case under consideration, the optimization condi-
tions may be stated as:






If each of the expected values can be determined, it is
possible to determine the expected costs associated with oil
pollution. The additional gain to the firm will come from
the product which is retained and- placed into the production
process to increase output. The firm sets its level of
pollution control such that the expected number of spills
and the costs associated with those spills added to the
increased production resulting from the additional efforts
equals the cost of the last unit of control effort.
It is useful to look at the optimization conditions as
they relate to this simple case. As in the previous, more
general model, the values of the variables can be graphed to
determine the optimal conditions. The discrete analysis
depicts each category of spill as a separate function as
shown in fig. (4) . Since:
df i < for i = 2,3,4
dr
and
df-; > for i = 1
dr
the necessary condition for a unique solution to the problem
















The impact of this representation is to show that the
firm will emply the efforts which achieve the greatest
return for each dollar spent on prevention. The optimal
course of action can be determined once their is an under-
standing of the costs associated with the prevention of
spills within a given size category . Quantification of those
costs is an important question for further analysis.
The firm may employ other strategies "based on its view
of the distribution of penalty costs and its degree of
concern over the impact of those costs. For instance, the
expected profit model does not account for the variance of
costs about the expected value. As the variance increases
the firm is likely to examine other decision criteria in
addition to expected value.
If a firm wishes to avoid the worst possible situation,
it will be motivated to employ a minimax strategy. In place
of the expected value of the (P«. ) penalty costs, the firm
will assess the maximum value for Pp. and analyze the
appropriate strategy using that value. Table X, in the next
section, shows the results of the minimax strategy on the
firm's assessment of oil spill costs.
Other decision criteria to be examined are:
1. Maximum likelihood -- The firm assumes that the most




2. Median -- The firm may use the median rather than the
mean to determine expected costs. This would be a greater
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likelihood if a few large values tended to skew the results
of the cost analysis.
Expected utility maximization is a variable on the ex-
pected profit motivation. It will not be explicitly
examined in this study, but is worthy of mention as a
possible alternative measure which incorporates a degree of
risk into the optimization function. Using expected
utility as its criterion, a firm would need to assess the
level of utility associated with various costs of pollution
incidents and set the optimum level of operations at the
point where the marginal utility per dollar spent. is equal
for pollution control, penalties avoided and marginal revenue.
The advantage of marginal utility analysis is that it incor-
porates a measure of the firm's assessment of the value of
various rewards and penalties for oil pollution. After a
cursory examination of the possible effects of quantifying a
firm's expected utility maximization on the model developed
here, it was decided not to include this variable since the
results would not significantly alter the trends illustrated
by the model.
After the presentation of data illustrated in the next
section, certain decision criteria will be evaluated by
inserting the values achieved from the analysis into the
optimization formula as the value for expected costs. The
firm's level of pollution control using the various criteria
will be analyzed for their applicability to the existing
37

pollution environment and to future decisions on the part of
the enforcement agencies and policy makers.
B. DATA PRESENTATION
Aggregated data for 1973 and 197^ is presented in the
form of tables and figures depicting the distribution of the
data. Tables I and II contain the principle breakdown of
costs for the two-year period. The expected costs shown in
those tables do not always show the true distribution of the
data; therefore, figures 5 through 8 are included to show,
graphically, the distribution of penalty and cleanup costs.
Table III summarizes the median, mode, and maximum values
from the figures.
The cost data for a large corporation was extracted from
the data to illustrate an individual firm's record and
determine whether or not its record was distributed similarly
to the industry's. These figures are summarized in Table IV.
Finally, a breakdown of the data by District is given in
Table V. The data is not specifically analyzed in the study,
but variations between districts is evident. Further
analysis of the differences would help to define more clearly
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I
C. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO DATA
Four categories of oil spill problems will be analyzed
within the context of the decision model. The first two are
special cases, which, by their existence, set the basic level
of pollution control costs for the industry. The other
cases use the collected data to examine the results of the
model for the discrete and continuous cases.
The present level of oil spill control exists, in part,
by a desire of the firm to reduce the costs of lost product
and the impact of government regulations and controls on
standards of operations. In the absence of penalties and
controls the firm would be motivated to allocate resources to
pollution control as long as the expected marginal revenue
gained from the last unit of control effort was greater than
the cost of that additional unit of effort.
1 -
E(P-,3Z.)
9r i .e. ?
2
=
There is evidence to indicate that this strategy may apply to
the present situation under conditions where P
?
is small
relative to marginal revenue. The analysis of the discrete
case will treat this question in more detail.
The introduction of government regulations on the industry
added an additional factor to the decision process in the
form of penalties for spillage and failure to meet the stand-
ards and requirements established by lav/. The impact of
these regulations can be assessed by analyzing them quali-





3z_) - 9E( P
2 S)
A firm which has a continuous or chronic discharge of
oily wates as a result of inefficiencies in operations or a
chosen strategy to rid itself of "by-products of the pro-
duction process must secure a permit for the discharge. The
Environmental Protection Agency is responsible for issuing
permits to discharge into the waters of the U.S. It is
their policy to deny permission for any discharge of harmful
quantities of oil. To the extent that the policy is applied
and enforced, the problem of continuous discharge is
controlled. The firm will set the level of P 2 equal to the
expected level of penalties for continuous discharge. The
fine of $5000 per day and the additional liability for
cleanup operations would seem to be a significant motivator
to cease chronic pollution.
The effort that is required for the firm to reduce the
penalty is the effort which causes the discharge to cease to
be harmful. The consequences of the high penalties and
removal costs should be enough to convince all but the most
determined firms to cease continuous discharge of oily
wastes. If that fails, however, the Commander of the Coast
Guard District may suspend operations at that site until the
situation is remedied. The firm is forced to accept the costs




The degree to which efforts to control continuous
pollution are effective is determined "by the enforcement and
public relations effort. The visibility of oil on water and
the existing level of surveillance by the Coast Guard and the
public indicates that a continuous discharge will be recog-
nized promptly and is, therefore, not a critical question at
this time.
The second factor which sets the base level for pollution
control activity is the existence of regulations and
standards for equipment and operations. Existing regulations
are summarized in the second chapter of this thesis. In the
context of the decision model, a firm must comply with those
regulations or face similar penalties to the chronic discharge
case. The range of penalties for violation of standards,
however, is much greater than for discharges. A penalty for
the individual violation can be applied, or the Coast Guard
District Commander or EPA Regional Administrator can use his
prerogative to suspend operations of a firm that poses a
potential discharge threat. The effect of maximum penalties
on the firm are the same as for the continuous discharge
case. The smaller penalties for individual violations of
regulations may provide less incentive, and would be more
subject to enforcement variations. Each penalty could be
analyzed on an individual basis. It is the purpose of this
discussion to point up the impart of the regulations on the
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decision process which sets the firm's level of pollution
control efforts.
To determine how a firm will decide to incur additional
costs beyond the base of control effort described in regu-
lation, it is necessary to analyze the expected costs
associated with a pollution record. The costs within the
spill size categories have been assessed using the aggregate
data for 1973 a.nd 197^ • I"t must be assumed for this analysis
that the firm will use that aggregate data in its decision
process. This is, admittedly, an oversimplification of the
situation, but it serves to test the model using some data
from a large sample size.
Values for f . for the two-year period can be found in
Table VI. Expected costs in each category were multiplied
by the f . to determine the expected costs within that
category using the equation:
EfCostj) = P 2 i (f i )
The results of various decision criteria are tabulated in
tables VII through X. The expected value of product lost
is also included in the tables to show the relationship of
internal costs to the external assessments. The product
costs are an estimate using twenty-five cents per gallon.
They are intended to be used for purposes of determining
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SUMMARY OF OIL SPILL COSTS
Expected Value
Category Expected Penalty Expected Product
and Removal Costs Loss *
1973 1974
Minor Spills $700 $ 950 $ 15
Moderate Spills 150 700 60
400 600Major Spills 450
All Spills $1250 $2250 $ 525
Table VIII.
SUMMARY OF OIL SPILL COSTS
Most Likely (Mode) Value
Category Expected Penalty Expected Product
and Removal Costs Loss *
1973 1974
Minor Spills $900 $550 $ 15
Moderate Spills @ @ 60
Major Spills 0__ _@_ 450
All Spills @ @ 525
*Product Loss is used for order of magnitude only.
It is based on a price of twenty-five cents per gallon
which would vary greatly from time to time and from
industry to industry.
@ The mode in these categories does not provide












































^Product Loss is used for order of magnitude only.
See Table VII and VIII for further explanation.
&

The results for the two-year period for all of the
decision criteria except for maximum loss vary from one
thousand three hundred to two thousand three hundred dollars
($1300 - $2300) over the entire range of spill sizes. This
indicates that firms using these assumptions about the
probabilities and expected costs of spillage would solve
their optimization problem by employing that final unit of
effort (r) which costs the same as the marginal revenue
gained from that effort plus $1300 to $2300 worth of costs
avoided.
The firm which uses the maximum loss assessment technique
will be employing a pessimistic outlook on oil spill
probabilities and costs. They will be willing to spend
considerably more on pollution control. A firm with this
strategy might be expected to employ an inhouse removal
capability or contract with a cleanup firm in the form of a
type of insurance policy against the expected costs of
spillage
.
The continuous case requires a much more detailed analysis
of the probability and cost function. The probability
function for oil spills has been determined by analyzing the
data for 1973 and 197^. It has been determined that the
logarithm of the quantity spilled for both years is




The function is given by:
x:i-i *.-*. \ a - .9log(quanti ty)f (log quantity) = .9e






x tabulated(.995) = 148
However, attempts to find continuous functions for other
variables were not so fruitful. There does not seem to be
any simple linear relationship between civil penalties,
removal costs and quantity spilled. Additional effort is





The decision model which has been developed in this
thesis considers the economic aspects of a firm's oil
spill control strategy. The model demonstrates that a firm
will determine its optimal level of pollution control ex-
penditures by considering expected spill probabilities,
potential savings gained by preventing loss of oil products,
and the expected value of penalties for spillage. Assuming
that the firm is a rational, economic actor, it will set its
pollution control efforts at the level at which the added
revenue plus the savings in penalty costs equal the cost of
the last unit of pollution control effort.
Assumptions about the functional relationships between
costs and changes in model parameters were made which should
be tested in order to properly validate this model. The
model is a simplified representation of the decision process
employing microeconomic theory. Its assumptions are ones
which hold true in general; however, there remains some
question as to the exact nature of the relationships when
the parameters are more interdependent than have been
portrayed in this formulation.
The greatest value of the model from a practical stand-
point is that it has isolated and inferred relationships
between the major internal and external decision parameters
of the oil pollution question. It provides some qualitative
57
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framework for assessing the effect of proposed enforcement
efforts on the pollution strategy of the firm. In addition,
it can show the relative effects of variables which can be
quantified
.
The model may be extended beyond the oil pollution
problem. In general, it is a simple microeconomic decision
model which accounts for the effect of external costs on the
behavior of a firm. It may be extended into other areas such
as fisheries enforcement, other forms of pollution control,
and government intervention and regulation.
The data used in this thesis has limitations which have
been previously described. The results of the quantitative
analysis, therefore, are only a first approximation of the
relative importance of various variables. They do not
provide specific parameters for the decision problem. More
rigorous analysis of the data could produce more accurate
and more useful results for practical application. The
results of analysis using present data are reported below.
Civil penalties appear to have their greatest impact on
the firm's strategy relative to the minor spill problem. The
costs of product lost and the expected cost of cleanup are
small relative to the penalties. As other costs increase,
however, the size of the penalties reaches the upper bound
of five thousand dollars ($5000). Other costs tend to
become more significant, and the impact of the civil penalty
becomes negligible. The expected value of the civil penalty
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accounts for only a small fraction of the total expected cost
of a major incident.
Cleanup or removal costs have a significant impact on the
decision model. They account for the largest portion of the
external costs that the firm must internalize. The threat of
increased responsibility for cleanup and removal costs could
have a significant effect on the pollution control decisions
of the firm.
One of the most interesting results of this analysis
indicates that the costs associated with the loss of product
to the production process become increasingly important to
the pollution control decision. This implies that the firm
has a high internal motivation to reduce the probability of
spillage occurring. In the major spill category, this
internal motivation is equal to the total external patameters.
In addition, this model does not account for the value of a
lost tanker or other damaged equipment related to the oil
spill that will be added to the firm's costs. It appears
that in the major spill category, the firm's internal
motivation to reduce the probability of spillage is as great
as or greater than the present level of external pressure.
It appears at present that the externally levied costs
have the greatest impact in the moderate and small spill
categories. This tends to indicate that the strategy of the
enforcement agencies has been to reduce the level of minor




The options available to the enforcement program manager
are either to (l) increase the level of penalties, (2) in-
crease the standards for removal of pollutants, or
(3) increase the level of enforcement to increase the
application of the costs to the firm. Cleanup costs can be
increased by tougher controls on the degree of cleanup and
removal required. Penalties can only be increased to the
statutory limit. Increased enforcement effort will tend to
increase the probability that the firm will be assessed a
penalty and, therefore, increase the expected cost. Enforce-
ment agencies have the authority to suspend the operations
of firms which present a threat of spillage. The application
of that authority to chronic violators on a consistent basis
might provide added incentive to firms to control their
pollution problem. Since poor operations and faulty
equipment are the major causes of oil spill incidents, such
a threat might provide the incentive needed to maintain
equipment and train people properly.
The most significant conclusion of this application of
the model is that the firm's internal costs seem to have the
largest influence on its pollution control strategy. Present
levels of civil penalties and cleanup cost applications do
not seem to affect the strategy of the firm beyond the minor
and moderate size spill problem.
A number of other interesting questions remain.
Appendices B and C contain some thoughts about the data base
and the determination of the cost of oil spill incidents. In
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addition, it seems plausible that a simulation model could be
developed for analyzing the impact of proposed enforcement
strategies
.
Policy questions offer another exciting area for study.
What will be the impact of the addition of an import tax on
oil to be used to finance the Pollution Cleanup Revolving
Fund? How will it affect the decision strategy of the firm?
What effect would changes in the civil penalty structure
have on the decision process? Extremely high penalties are
being imposed on foreign fishing vessels who violate American
fisheries laws and claims of jurisdiction. Would the
assessment of such high penalties be politically acceptable
with U.S. firms as the targets? The present inference is
that the fisheries problem is more important than the oil
pollution problem?!
Much more can be done to analyze decisions and costs re-
lated to the oil spill problem. The results point to
interesting and, often, non- intuitive relationships between
decision parameters. The more accurate the understanding of
those relationships becomes, the more viable and practical
will be the results from this type of analysis. This model
has been a first step in isolating the parameters and re-
lationships in the economic sense. Further study is





PIRS Forms and Data Format
Information enters the PIRS system by being typed on 80
column cards using the format on the following three forms.
Data is transferred at Coast Guard Headquarters to Magnetic
Tape using the format on pages following the PIRS report
forms. Data contains k2k characters per record and is





U. S. COAST GUARD
CG-»H r'0 UO-74)
POLLUTION INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM
(PIRS)
(DISCHARGE)
INPUT TO PIRS PRE-EDIT 12210M
NOTE: 1. A - Alpha, N • Numeric (zero-fill). A N - Alpha Numenc
2. Columns 1 thru 16 some Tor both cords.














8 - 13 (N)
























21 - 23 (N)
24 - 33 (A/N)
34-35 (A)
36 - 38 (N)
39 - 41 (A/N)
42 - 49 (N)
51-52 (A)
54-55 (N)
56 - 59 (N)
60 - 67 (A/N)
69 - 74 (A/N)
75 - 80 (N)
1










21 - 25 (N)
26 - 30 (N)
31 - 35 (N)
40-41 (AN)
42 (N)
44 - 53 (AN)


















U. S. COAST GUARD
CG-48WA (10-7-4)
POLLUTION INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM
(PIRS)
IRESPOUSE)
INPUT TO PIRS REPORT I2210M
NOTE: 1. A - Alpha, H - Numeric (Zero-fill), A N - Alpha-Numeric, and N 5 - Numeric-Special Character.
2. Columns 1 thru 16 same on all cards.














































22 - 24 (N)
25-26 (N)
27 - 30 (N)
31 - 33 (N)
•34 - 36 (N)
37 - 39 (N)
40 - 42 (N)
43-45 (N)
55 - 57 (N)
58 - 60 (N)
61 - 63 (N)
64 - 66 (N)
67 - 69 (N)
70 - 72 (N)




















Expenditures (rem Pollution Fund
Reimbursements to Pollution Fund
Reimbursements Pending
Incomplete Reimbursement -Re ..son
17 (N)
21 - 23 (N)
24 - 26 (N)
33 - 35 (N)
36 - 43 (AN)
44 - 51 (N S) S
52 - 58 (N) S
59 - 65 (N) S
66-72(N) S
73 (N)
75 - 80 (N)
4
Days





U. S. COAST GUARD
CG-4890B MO-74)
POLLUTION INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM
(PIRS)
(PENALTY ACTION)
INPUT TO PIRS PRE-EDIT 12210M
NOTE: 1. A - Alpho, N - Numeric (lerofill)
2. Columns 1 thru 16 tome on oil cards.
3. The following Cord Numbers will be used when: No Action - Cord 6, 1st action- Cord 6, 2nd action - Cord 7,
3rd action • Card 8. and 4th action - Card 9.














8 - 13 (N)















No Coast Guard Action - Reason
Initiating Agency
Authority
Action Taken Against (Party)
Action Date
Referral to U. S. Attorney
Referral to COMDT Other Agency
Action by U. S. Attorney
Pencil ty






Civil Action Appealed to U. S. Court


















53 - 57 (N)
58 (N)
75 - 80 (N)
Month Day
No - 0/Yes - 1
S/R/P
No - 0/Yes - 1






































































































































































































Notes on an Oil Spill Cost Model
Any spillage of oil or chemicals into the waters of the
world represents a loss of product to the economy. This loss
is equal to the market value of the product lost. If the
spill size, itself, is of sufficient magnitude to affect the
aggregate economics of oil, the market value could change as
a result of the spill. Estimates of the spillage that occurs
each year run to approximately five million tons; however,
this accounts for just a little over one per cent of the total
volume of oil shipped by sea each year. It seems more likely,
therefore, that a large spill would result in a local dis-
ruption rather than a market change in price. Simply
stated, the loss associated with a given oil spill is:
Loss = kS .
where k is the market price prevailing for the product and
S is the size of the spill in gallons.
In addition to the loss of product, there will always be
damage done to the aquatic environment and possibly spillover
to the surrounding land areas. Many fractions of oil are
soluble in water. When a spill occurs, these fractions will
be taken into solution where the damage they inflict can not
be reversed by simple removal of the visible product.
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The environmental damage factor is complicated by the
existence of short and longer range effects. An initial
shellfish kill might "be the predecessor of a longer range
decrease in the commercial fishing value in an area. Little
has been done in the way of rigorous studies to quantify the
value of the environmental damage done by an oil spill. What
is the total environmental cost of an oil spill? This is
more difficult to assess than just adding up the cost of the
product lost. Laws relating to the imposition of fines and
civil penalties on discharges of oil state that the fine is
to be based on the toxicity, size, dispersion characteristics,
and degradability of the substance. It is the opinion of
this author that the laws have left out the most important
variable. The location of the spill is critical to the cost
that is incurred. A given spill of size (S) and toxicity (T)
with dispersion characteristics and degradability (C) will do
more or less damage depending on the area it is going to
affect. It seems reasonable to assume that the cost of
environmental damage is, therefore:
D = S-f (T)-f(C).f (location)
where S is a quantity and the other functions are all related
to appropriate scale.
Toxicity and oil characteristics could be graded by a
scale of 1 - 100, where increasingly toxic and persistent
materials would be weighted by their relative hazard to the
environment. The important step is to select an appropriate
scale. The most toxic materials should have a scale value
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proportional to the damage they cause which is proportional
to the least toxic and the damage it causes.
Scaling these factors would result in a relative measure
of the costs incurred due to the pollutant's potency and
potential to do damage. An appropriate measure might be to
express toxicity in terms of potential kill per concentration
per unit area. That value could then be determined by
surveying the system in which the spill occurs and multiplying
the toxicity factor by the density of affected organisms and
the area which they cover. One would then arrive at some
measure of the actual damage suffered due to the introduction
of the pollutant into the area.
It is the discussion of location value that holds the
most potential for further study. Many of the tools and
surveys needed for analysis of relative value by spill area
already exist. The requirement for implementation of re-
gional contingency plans for oil and hazardous substance
spills has generated much of the needed information. The
Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Geologic Survey have
made detailed surveys of the water quality and coastal zone
uses, and there are numerous local surveys done by local
government and educational institutions which have charted
the density and life cycles of marine organisms. Rather than
summarize all the data available and the results which come
to mind from intuitive formulation, it is more appropriate to
list some of the major writings and publications which could
lead the potential researcher to diverse and intriguing studies
7^

First, however, it is important to see the conceptual
framework which has been used to understand the value of
approaching the problem of cost determination from this point
of view.
For a small area such as a bay, harbor, or a river
running into the ocean, it is possible to determine the
commercial value of the fisheries in that area, including the
value of fish nurseries and particular organisms vital to the
food chain of other commercial fisheries. Recreational
values can be quantified in a rough sense, by taking a census
of boaters and bathers who use the area and valuing that
usage in man days used per unit area. Even property values
and the value for commercial enterprises, such as restaurants
utilizing the scenic value of the waterfront, can be roughly
quantified to add to the determination of value of any
particular water area.
As an example of the type of figures that can be derived
by systematic and thorough analysis of an area, Dr. Beatrice
Willard has estimated that one acre of saltgrass marsh has a
potential value of over $85,000 per year (23). This figure
includes its value as a commercial fishery, nursery for other
fishes, watershed and flood control plain, and other quanti-
fiable factors. Saltgrass marsh is a particularly productive
and valuable water area. It is not as scenic, perhaps, as a
jagged shoreline with spectacular surf, but in terms of
biological value, it is certainly unrivaled.
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Quantifiable costs, however, leave out important vari-
ables in the valuation of potential damage to a waterway or
the surrounding shoreline. How can the uniqueness of a
mangrove swamp or the home of an endangered species be
valued? What is the value of an historical site? How can a
price tag be placed on aesthetic beauty? These factors,
for the moment, can not be adequately quantified.
The researcher must turn to another method of determining
the value of the waters of the coastline that he is
surveying. Ian McHarg, in his book, Design With Nature,
presents an intriguing look at the valuation of the so-called
"nonquantifiables. " He approaches the act of land-use
planning in an effort to minimize the total social cost while
maximizing the social benefit. A similar technique could be
applied to the valuation of our coastline.
It must be assumed that pollution of an area which is
relatively more valuable than another is less desirable than
pollution of a less valuable area. This might imply that if
we know that incidents are going to occur, efforts should be
employed which will seek to minimize the value lost by their
occurrence. McHarg' s method of determining relative value is
to take a chart of the area under consideration and make
extensive surveys to determine the variables that impact the
value determination and split those variables into three
zones. Each of the zones indicates some degree of value
associated with that variable. For instance, historical
value might be divided into the following three zones:
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Zone 1. unique historical landmark -- of great
importance
Zone 2. historical area -- no single unique landmark in
danger from oil spills
Zone 3* little or no historical value -- value would be
unaffected by oil spills.
This is a typical way in which each variable might be
categorized. All variables are given relative values
using similar scales. The most vulnerable zones are always
Zone 1 and the least vulnerable, Zone 3» McHarg makes no
attempt to give relative value to the variables, themselves;
but if a particular variable or set of variables appears to
be important, it may be broken down into more than one var-
iable to give it extra weight. The Zones are then super-
imposed on the area charts and shaded according to increasing
vulnerability. When all of the variables have been charted,
the overlays are all placed together. The result is a
composite which gives some indication of the relative value
or, in this case, vulnerability to oil spills. It is
important to note that the studies done by McHarg are pri-
marily concerned with land-use planning. It is his technique
which could have important applications for solving the oil
spill cost problem.
Once a form of relative cost has been assessed, it can be
used as a scaling factor to alter the toxicity, character-
istics and size parameters of the cost function. A wholesale
study might be expensive and possibly, even, inefficient if it
were attempted on a highly formalized and national basis, but
7?

the tolls for the regional manager to employ such a technique
are right at his fingertips. The following annotated
bibliography contains much of the information needed to do an
adequate job of placing a relative cost on oil spills that
occur and in helping the manager employ his resources to
reduce the expected cost of oil spills in his area.
McHarg, Ian L. , Design With Nature
,
(Published for the
Museum of Natural History by Doubleday & Company, Inc.,
Garden City, New York, 1969)
.
This work defines the methodology and the ideology for
the assessment of relative cost and values associated with
geographic representations of land-use planning. • The
techniques and outlook can be extrapolated to the oil spill
problem.
Isard, Walter and others, Ecologic-Economic Analysis for
Regional Development
,
(The Free Press, New York, 1972) .
"Some initial explorations with particular reference to
recreational resource use and environmental planning." This
book is more quantitative in its scope, but offers a similar
analysis framework to McHarg' s. It is applied to marine-
related questions and contains a case study for the selection
of a marina site in Plymouth-Kingston-Durbury Bay area in
Massachusetts. It attempts to build a cost model for the
ecological costs associated with the decision of placing a
marina in the bay;
U.S. Coast Guard, A Suggested Development Plan for a
Regional Contingency Plan Data Base , U.S. Gov't.
Printing Office, April 197^. Prepared by the Office





This report suggests the strategy and format of a
Regional Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan. The
major contribution of this report to this subject is that if
the plan is followed closely, the region will have a good
grasp of the local knowledge and material available for
doing a value survey of their area. It will, in itself, be a
primary source for information and data.
U.S. Coast Guard Region I, Multi-Agency Oil and
Hazardous Materials Pollution Contingency Plan (Coastal)
,
CCGDONE INSTRUCTION P5922,3A of 20 April 1972.
This is an example of a regional plan which contains many
vital contacts for information relating to costing oil spills.
Local agencies and industries involved in pollution control
and commerce are listed and annotated.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, National Shoreline Study,
Regional Inventory Report, (For this study -- North
Atlantic Region), 1971.
Volume I contains description and history of shoreline as
well as current projects underway. Volume II of this study
contains detailed maps of the shoreline with simple legends
of ownership and principle use, as well as an indication of
shoreline erosion and structure conditions. This could be
used as a first source for a simple managerial planning model
for spill containment and surveillance.
Certainly there needs to be a great deal of effort ex-
pended to have a vigorous, accurate concept of oil spill
cost and potential cost, but the payoff is in an increased
efficiency for pollution prevention and control effort. In
addition, it would prove helpful in assessing appropriate
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Notes On the PIRS Data Base
The Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) as revised
in 1973 was used as the primary data base for this study.
The data base contains a great deal of information in a
highly usable format. The comments which follow are offered
as the impressions of a user of PIRS and suggestions for
improving the existing system. Issues that will be dis-
cussed are
:
1. Technical aspects of the data structure
2. Questions relating to the usefulness of the data
The data contained on magnetic tape contained numerous
errors. The error rate was not high; however, for this
analysis a number of data fields had to be rejected due to
errors in numeric fields. Errors which could be easily
detected seemed to be restricted to certain fields whose
removal did not affect this study. Questions relating to a
more comprehansive study, such as an oil spill simulation
model would require the use of those fields for usable re-
sults to be generated.
The most common of this type of error were:
1. Location: Latitude and Longitude were expressed as
35-3N instead of 35-18. Inclusion of alphanumeric characters
into the field either causes the data to be rejected or makes
the data inaccurate for use.
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2, Quantity: There were two common errors in this and
other fields where numerical variables were entered.
.
a. Zeros (0) and the letter "0" were interchanged
causing the same error as in (l) above.
b. Figures were not right- justified in the field.
The result was figures which were too large or, in some cases,
when the code following the value was also moved left, the
error similar to (l) above occurred.
3. Quantity removed: A more subtle error entered into
this field. In a number of instances, the quantity removed
was significantly greater than the quantity spilled ( e.g . , a
spill of less than ten gallons had more than a million gallons
removed) . This error could have resulted from misplacement
of the data in the field, or, more subtly, differing
opinions as to the meaning of the data field could have been
employed.
^. Fields related to penalty action administration were
not used as extensively for this study; however, similar
errors may likely exist in those fields.
These data errors point to possible problem areas in the
collection and encoding of the data. A first hunch was that
the data resulted from key punching errors. Contact with the
Twelfth Coast Guard District ADP office brought out the fact
that data is verified before being submitted to batch
processing in headquarters. This does not rule out error,
but indicates that similar errors are being made on the veri-
fication punch to those that occur on initial punching.
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The form of the data arriving at the encoding point may
account for this type of error. The key punch operators
probably have very little idea of the meaning of the coded
data they receive from the MEP office. If a field is de-
fined as containing alphanumeric data, it is difficult to
know whether to punch a zero or an "0" if the character on
the form is "0".
The person filling out the forms must be meticulous to
differentiate between letters and numbers. PIRS has settled
on the convention of putting slashes through the number and
this convention should be known expressly to the operators.
The form, itself, may be part of the problem. If the
fields were broken down into their component parts, the
errors might not be as likely to occur. As shown in the
figure below, the data fields for quantity and affected
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Ad additional problem area occurs when the person entering
the data does not right or left justify the data on the form,
resulting in strange results in some fields.
These errors are probably well known to the users and
designers of the PIRS system, but the data base still suffers
from their existence. The time required to track down these
errors is not productive to the research, and the research
suffers from the need to discard whole data fields from the
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analysis. It is necessary to either prepare a complex de-
bugging program for the data base or to spend effort on
improving data preparation and transmittal to the central
data base.
From the standpoint of the researcher tapping into a
relatively untried data base, the temptation was to be
skeptical of the results of any analysis. It would have been
easy to accept without question the data as it existed on the
computer tapes, since it is a well known fact that data
undergoes a miraculous change from subjectivity and estim-
ation to objectivity and accuracy when it is coded as
magnetic spots on a reel of computer tape. But working with
the data raised serious, persistent questions as to its
accuracy. To be more precise, the questions relate to
whether or not the results that come from the data are really
valid. For instance, the rate of unknown or unentered in-
formation in certain data fields ranges up toward 50$ of the
total. With over 25,000 pieces of data, the temptation is to
assume that the missing data has the same distribution as does
the existing information. This may very well be true for
certain data fields but could be totally wrong for others.
If errors are consistently made at certain levels of data, it
could radically distort the distributions from their actual
shape. Some of the items that intuitively seemed inconsistent
were
:
1. Location: A plot of the latitude and longitude for
the Twelfth Coast Guard District for one quarter of 197^
Qk

showed a large number of incidents which occurred outside of
the district or on dry land.
2. Quantity: This is often a subjective determination
with a high degree of variability. The eighth position on
the data field could be expanded to include some measure of
"degree of confidence" in the estimate, such as:
a. A quantity known for sure (by measurement or
metered data) gallons
b. B quantity estimated (estimate is considered
good — person qualified to judge the amount) gallons
c. C quantity estimated (fair estimation) gallons
d. D quantity estimated (poor or unknown accuracy)
gallons





3. Notifier: When the notifier was listed as a commercial
source, there was some question as to whether it was from the
source or reported by a neighboring industry or passing
vessel.
The second part of this field is used to indicate the time
elapsed between occurrence of the spill and notification or
discovery. The results for the Twelfth Coast Guard District
(quarter 1 197*0 indicate that the vast majority of spills
are discovered and reported immediately. Intuitively, there
remains some question as to that fact. The point is, that
studies of certain data fields might produce data vastly dif-
ferent from that which is reported.
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^. Cost of Cleanup: Cost relating to use of federal,
state and local government personnel and equipment does not
enter into the determination of many spill's costs. The
inclusion of those costs would be helpful in determining the
cost versus size function for oil spills. The results might
be very imformative if government resources were costed at
their fair market value.
5- Amount Recovered: In some cases the amount recovered
exceeds the spill size. This indicates that errors in data
recording or reporting philosophy are occurring. If a spill
from a grounded tanker amounts to half a million gallons, but
removal operations recover twenty million gallons before it
enters the water, the reporter must decide whether to report
removal of the oil which entered the water or the total re-
covered. It is important to distinguish between those
figures when they are entered into the system. This might call
for an additional data field which is called "total product
recovered by operations."
6. Degree of Impact: The range of degree of impact with
spill size was slight. The average minor spill did negligible
damage, the average moderate spill slight damage, and the
average large spill slight to moderate damage. This seems
inconsistent with the objective of the oil pollution control
program. If spills aren't doing much damage, why should
they be controlled!
The use of any computerized data base without proper
control and some form of feedback to the operating level is
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asking for enormous problems with the system and the results
taken from analysis of the data. It is understood by the
author that a feedback report is being prepared for Coast
Guard District Offices. It is hoped that the reports will be
used and passed on to all operating units to be used as a
source of information and as the impetus to study the reporting
system itself.
The manager who receives the feedback report should ask
himself two simple questions:
1. Does this report reflect my perception of the oil
spill problem?
2. If it doesn't, what's the difference between my
perception and what is coming out on this report?
Discrepancies in the perceived oil spill problem and the
feedback reports indicate that what is being sent to head-
quarters is not being interpreted in the same way by various
units. These discrepancies can be tracked down and the re-
porting process can be altered to more accurately reflect the
oil pollution problem within the local area. If every
district points up discrepancies and attempts to make the
reports reflect the actual pollution situation in their
district, the entire data base will be strengthened. It will
become more accurate, more standardized, and of more use to
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